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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH. 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) 
Plaintiff and Respondent ) 
) Case No. 
Vs. ) 
) 
FRANK DAVID CLAUSON, ) 
) 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATE~mNT OF THE CASE. 
Frank David Clauson was on the 19th day of Sep-
tember, 1955, in Wasatch County, Utah, charged with the 
crime of sodomy as follows: in that the said Frank 
David Clauson on or about the 14th day of September, 
1955, in Wasatch County, State of Utah, did commit 
the crime of sodomy upon the person of Mavis North 
(R-2). 
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The defendant was bound over for trial upon a 
waiver of preliminary hearing (R-1) and defendant 
appeared for arraignment on September 23, 1955 (R-1) 
and was returned to the Justice's Court in and for 
Heber Precinct, Wasatch County, State of Utah, for 
preliminary hearing by request of Glen s. Hatch, 
attorney for defendant (R-1). Preliminary hearing 
was had September 27, 1955, and the defendant was 
bound over to the District Court for trial by Archie 
D. Buys, Justice of the Peace (R-1-2) (R-4)o The 
defendant appeared for arraignment October 11, 1955, 
and on October 11, 1955 the defendant demanded a 
Bill of Particulars (R-7), which was furnished De-
cember 10, 1955, (R~9). Upon the defendant's plea 
of not guilty entered October 11, 1955, before the 
Honorable Joseph E. Nelson, one of the judges of the 
Fourth Judicial District of the State of Utah, in and 
for Wasatch County, the case came on for hearing be-
fore a jury on the 50th day of November, 1955· Then 
proceeded to trial after both the defendant and the 
State had exhausted their preemptory challenges, and 
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the defense rested. The jury retired at 2;35 o 1clock 
P.M. on December 1, 1955 (Tr-155). Defendant excepted 
to court's refusal to give all the requested instruc-
tions Numbers 1 to 6 inclusive (Tr-154). The Court 
gave its instructions covering the offense, together 
with stock instructions (Tr-135-Tr-15)). Arguments 
were presented. The jury retired and returned a ver-
dict of guilty. Defendant was sentenced by the Court 
for an indeterminate period, not to exceed twenty 
years in the Utah State Prison. Within the time pro-
vided by law the defendant appealed to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utaho 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
On the 14th day of September, 1955, the defend-
ant, Frank David Clauson, -at the request of Mavis 
North, took her from Park City, Utah, to Heber-City, 
Utah, in his automobile. The defendant, Frank David 
Clauson, and ~he complaining witness, Mavis North, 
met on the 14th day of September, 1955, in a beer 
tavern in Park City, Summit County, Utah1 known as 
The Drift. and after havin~ a few drinks of beer, 
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at the request of the complaining witness, the de-
fendant agreed to drive her to Heber City in his auto-
mobile. After leaving the Drift, the complaining wit-
ness went to the Utah State Liquor Store and purchased 
a fifth of wine for them to drink on the way to Heber 
City (Tr-11). The State contends that on the way to 
Heber City, near the town of Keetley, the defendant 
pulled off of the main highway and drove some distance 
up a side road and that the defendant through force and 
fear induced the complaining witness to commit the 
act of sodomy (Tr-14, line 12-Tr-22A, line 5), and 
that during the time of the alleged act of the defend-
ant an automobile drove up in the close vicinity 
(Tr-22A, line 12). It was still light (Tr-58, line 9) 
(Tr-?9, line 27 to 29). The complaining witness 
testified that she told Mr. Clauson that she wou~d 
give it to him if he would take it in a decent way 
(Tr-J4, lines_7 and 8), but the prosecutrix had been 
charged with adultery in Wasatch County, State of 
Utah, prior to September 14, 1955 (Tr-1)-14-15 and 
Tr-~). The Prosecutrix and the plaintiff were 
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friendly immediately after the alleged criminal acts 
in that prosecutrix purchased some beer for defend-
ant at Keatley on the way back to Heber and that she 
told defendant that if he wanted intercourse he could 
have it, but he would have to take it the right way 
{Tr-41, line 17-18-19); that she was not frightened of 
him when the automobile was parked near them (Tr-51, 
lines 20 to 30). After reaching Heber both of them 
drove to the hospital and visited the prosecutrix's hus-
band {Tr-59, line 29). Immediately following, defend-
ant and prosecutrix drove back to a beer joint and pro-
secutrix bought defendant some more beer (Tr-61, lines 
12-24). After the prosecutrix purchased a bottle of 
whiskey at the State Liquor Store at Heber, two days 
after the alleged act took place, at approximately 
1:)0 in the afternoon of that day, the prosecutrix 
complained to the Sheriff of Wasatch County about the 
alleged act of the defendant on the two days previous 
{Tr-27). All of the testimony of the prosecutrix 
relative to turning off from the main Heber Highway, 
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and the act which took place thereat, was denied by 
the defendant (Tr-108, line 7, Tr-110, line 11). The 
court allowed, over defendant's objection, hearsay 
testimony of a conversation between the Sheriff of 
Wasatch County, and the complaining witness as to the 
alleged actions of the defendant and out of the pre-
sence of the defendant. Before the jury retired the 
court submitted to them three forms of verdict, sub-
stantially as follows: (1) We, the jury impaneled 
in the above entitled cause, find the defendant 
guilty of the crime of sodomy as charged in the infor-
mation. (2) We, the jury impaneled in the above en-
titled cause, find the defendant guilty of the crime 
of intent to commit sodomy charged in the informationo 
(?) We, the jury impaneled in the above entitled 
cause, find the defendant not guilty. 
Before the jury retired for deliveration, dur-
ing the instruction to the jury upon the law relative 
to the matter, the court refused to give the follow-
ing instructions requested by the defendant: "You 
are instructed that the defendant cannot be convicted 
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on the sole and uncorroborated testimony of an accom-
plice. By this is meant that if the only proof of any 
one fact essential to the crime is furnished by an ac-
complice, then you must find the defendant not guilty.n 
STATEMENT OF POINTS. 
1. THE COURT ERRED IN FURNISHING THE JURY WITH 
FORMS OF VERDICT IN THE MATTER, FAILING AJ.\1D NEG-LECT-
ING TO FURI~ISH VERDICTS FOR !1~ AND ALL INCLUDED OF-
FENSES, PARTICULARLY A VERDICT OF PROPER FORM TO EN-
ABLE THE JURY TO FlliD THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF ATTEMPT 
TO COMMIT SODOMY. 
2o THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFEND-
ANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS: nyou ARE FURTHER IN-
STRUCTED THAT IF THE WITNESS, MAVIS NORTH, CONSENTED 
TO THE ALLEGED ACT OF SODOMY, SHE WOULD THEN BE AN 
ACCOMPLICE, A}ID UNLESS HER TESTIMONY AS TO ANY ESSEN-
TIAL FACT WERE CORROBORATED, YOU SHOULD FIND THE DE-
FENDAl\IT NOT GUILTY." 
"YOU ARE INSTRUCTED THAT THE DEFENDANT CANNOT 
BE CONVICTED ON THE SOLE AND UNCORROBORATED TESTI-
MONY OF AN ACCOMPLICE. BY THIS IS MEANT THAT IF THE 
ONLY PROOF OF ANY ONE FACT ESSENTIAL TO THE CRIME IS 
FURNISHED BY AN ACCOMPLICE, THEN YOU MUST FIND THE 
DEFENDANT NOT GUILTY. 11 
,. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY ON ITS OWN VOLITION v!HETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUT-
ING WITNESS COULD HAVE BEEN AN ACCOMPLICE UNDER THE 
FACTS AND CIRCill1STANCES 0~1 THE CASE. 
4. THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING IN EVIDENCE 
HEARSAY STATEMlilTTS AND CONCLUSIONS ARISING FROM CON-
VERSATIONS NOT IN THE PRESENCE OF THE DEFENDANT. 
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ARGUMENT. 
POINT NO. I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FURNISHING THE JURY WITH 
FOMRS OF VERDICT IN THE MATTER, FAILING AND NEGLECT-
ING TO FURNISH VERDICTS FOR ANY AND ALL INCLUDED OF-
FENCES, PARTICULARLY A VERDICT OF PROPER FOID~ TO EN-
ABLE THE JURY TO FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF ATTEMPT 
TO COMMIT SODOMY. 
The court erred in not furnishing the jury with 
sufficient and proper forms of verdicts to cover all 
and any included offences, comprehending all the facts 
and evidence testified to, and involved in the case, 
and particularly a verdict in proper form to enable the 
jury to find, if in their judgment the facts justified 
the same, that the defendant was guilty of an attempt 
to commit sodo~ only. In the case Cupp vs. State 
(74 SW2nd 801), the Court said: 
We believe the better practice would be, if the 
court is going to give to the jury a form of ver-
dict, it should give a form of every kind of ver-
dict that may possibly be returned by the jury. 
Otherwise, it may be construed by the jury to 
mean that the court is of the opinion that only 
a certain kind of verdict was justified under the 
law and the facts. 
and then ~rent on to comment: 
However, in the instant case the jury assessed a 
:,,,_ ,:-::.:·· :: in the penitentiary, 
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which is the ~aximum penalty for murder without 
malice, when the minimum penalty with malice is 
two years. Therefore, if the charge was error it 
was harmless error. Harmless error is no grounds 
for reversal. 
In the case of Riley vs. State, a Texas case, 19?4, 
(75 SW 2nd 880) on a rehearsing the court found the 
following: 
That said paragraph 22 of th·e case ignored the 
right of the appellant to hav~ the jury told 
what form of verdict they should render if they 
found the appellant guilty of assault to murder 
without malice is beyold question, as is also 
·the materiality of the same as likely to inflict 
injury upon the appellant from the standpoint of 
the possible infliction of the lighter pen~ 
alty if proper forms of verdict had been submit-
ted, and also the possible recommen~ation of a 
suspended sentence in such case. The attention 
of the court below was pointedly called to the er-
ror by a specific exception. We think we erred 
in not directing a reversal of the ease for such 
error. 
The case was reversed and remanded. 
In the case of Peopee· vs. Pratt ( 228 Pac. 47), a 
California case, 1924, wherein the form of the ver-
diet, which was given by the court to the jury, would 
have been sufficient prior to the amendment of the 
act \vhich took place after the arrest of the def.end-
ant. but before trial. the court held that the form 
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of the verdict being sufficient prior to the amendment, 
that this offence would not come under the amendment, 
and therefore denied reversal of the trial court 1 $ 
decision. However, in its obiter dictum, the court 
states: 
When forms of verdict are submitted to the jury 
they should be comprehensive enough to cover 
every phase of the law under the evidence, and 
should include any kind of verdict that the jury 
would be warranted in returning after its delib-
eration, and this is especially so where a stat-
ute requires that a yerdict of guilty shall ass-
ess the degree of the crime, and the place of 
imprisonment. If, therefore, the defendant was 
entitled to the benefit of the amendment it is 
clearly apparent that his substantial rights have 
been affected. 
In West vs. State (208 Pac. 412), an Arizona case, 
July 20, 1922, the court held that it is claimed that 
because section 1084 of the penal code provides that 
When the defendant is acquitted upon the grounds 
that he was insane at the time of the commission 
of the act charged, the verdict must be.not 
guilty by reason of insanity. A form of verdict 
ineorporating that idea should also have been 
submitted to the jury, and a failure to do so 
was error; also, that it was error to tell the 
jury that if they found the defendant insane at 
the time the act was committed, they should re-
turn a verdict of not guilty. 
While the law does not. make it a duty of the 
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court to submit forms of verdicts to the jury, 
it may be conceded that when he does so he 
should submit as many forms as the facts of the 
case would permit to be returned. But before 
a failure to do so could be made the basis of 
a reversible error, it must be made to appear 
that the om.ission:prejudiced in some way the 
rights of the defendant. 
The court held in that matter that the verdict giv-
en by the judge, and acted upon by the jur,y, was 
more.favorable to the defendant, and-therefore his 
rights were not prejudiced. 
It is the contention of the defendant that when 
the court furnished th~ forms of verdict, as set forth 
above, enumerated and designated as Nos. 1, 2 and 3, 
the forms of verdict so furnished did not comprehend 
or embrace all of the offences which might have been 
deliberated upon by the jury, and that the form of 
verdict designated as Number 2 set forth no kfund of 
offence which the jur.y might have found the defend-
ant guilty of, to-wit 
We, the jury impaneled in the above entitled 
cause, find the defendant guilty of the crime of 
intent to commit sodomy charged in the informa-
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tion. 
The intent to commit sodomy is, of course, an essen-
tial element to the crime of sodo~ itself, and· the 
intent to commit sodomy is not a crime under the stat-
ute or at common law. In all probability what the 
court below had in mind in presenting such forms to 
the jury was that the jur.y might have found the de-
fendant guilty of attempt to commit sodomy, which form 
of werdict was never given to the j~, and therefore 
they-had no opportunity to consider such included of-
fense although the court had instructed them on such 
an offense (R-22, Instructions 4 and 5). It is fur-
ther contended by the defendant that the failure to 
furnish a proper form on an attempt to commit sodomy, 
which the court had instructed upon, amounts to such 
I 
error as warrants a reversal of the judgment and sen-
tence of the court below, that fromfue forms of ver-
diet furnished to the jur.y the opportunity to consider 
under those forms the question of guilt or innocence 
of the defendant of the lesser crime of an attempt to 
commit sodomy, was denied by the jur,y by the failure of 
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of the court to furnish such proper form. Moreover, 
the jury may have construed the forms furnished as 
giving them no other choice than to consider and de-
liberate on the guilt of the defendant of the crime of 
sodomy as charged in the information, or to consider 
an acquittal of that charge, since no instruction was 
given them consistent with the second form furnished. 
Who can say that the jur,y would not have consider-
ed the included offense if a proper form of verdict 
had been furnished them? That under the forms furn-
ished, the· court had been persuaded by the evidence 
that no such form was necessary, and therefore the 
·jury might find the defendant guilty of committing 
the creme of sodomy as charged in the information, or 
might not find him guilty of such offense? The de-
fendant contends that he was entitled to have the 
included offense of attempt to commit sodomy consid-
ered, and that such consideration might have been sug-
gested by a proper form of verdict, had it been given. 
The defendant contends that it was the duty of the court 
in furnishin~ one or more forms of verdict for the 
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jury's consideration, to furnish proper forms for all 
offenses which might be comprehended and included in 
the charge against the defendant as set forth in the 
information; that under the law and facts of the case 
at bar, that the trial court in failing to furnish 
the jur.y with the proper form of verdict covering and 
embracing the lesser offense of an attempt to commit 
sodomy was a derrogation of, and prejudicial to the 
substantive rights of the defendant, and particularly 
in view of Instructions 4 and 5 given the ju~ as 
cited above. 
POINT NO. II 
THE COURT ERRED lli REFUSING TO GRANT DEFEND-
Al'JT • S REQU~STED INSTRUCTIONS: 11YOU ARE FURTHER IN! 
STRUCTED THAT IF Tlffi WITNESS, :MAVIS NORTH, CONSENTED 
TO THE ALLEGED ACT OF SODOMY, SHE ~-JOULD THEN BE AN 
ACCOIVJPLICE, AND UNLESS HER TESTIMONY AS TO AJ-::JY ESSEN-
TIAL FACT \tJERE CORROBORATED, YOU SHOULD FIND THE DE-
FENDANT NOT GUILTY. " 
•ryou ABE INSTRUCTED THAT THE DEFENDANT CAN!WID 
BE CONVICTED ON THE SOLE AND UNCORROBORATED TESTI-
MONY OF AN ACCOMPLICE. BY THIS IS l"lEANT 11HAT IF rrHE 
ONLY PROOF OF ANY ONE FACT ESSENTIAL TO THE CRIME IS 
FURNISHED BY AN ACCOMPLICE, THEN YOU IVJUST FIND THE 
DEFENDANT NOT GUILTY. 11 
The defendant contends that under the facts and 
the testimony as rendered in the case at bar, the 
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question of whether or not,,under such facts and testi-
mony, Jflavis North, the complaining witness herein, was 
or was not an accomplice, was a question of fact which 
~hould have been submitted to the j~ry under proper in-
structions, and that the court's refusal to give the 
requested instructions of the defendant, or instruc-
tions on its own volition, amounted to a prejudicial 
error. 
In the case of People vs. Featherstone (67 Cal. 
App. 2nd 793; 155 Pac. 2nd, 685) the court said: 
When the question of an accomplice arises in the 
trial of a case, the general and accepted rule 
is:r'for the court to instruct the jury touching 
the law of accomplices, a.nd leave the question of 
whether or not the witness be an accomplice for 
the decision of the jur,y as a matter of fact. 
Cited in that case with approval is the ca.se of Peo-
ple vs. Coffey (161 California 44), 119 Pac. 901) in 
which case the court held: 
Whether or not a witness is an accomplice of the 
accused is for the determinatimn of the jUlJT on 
conflicting evidence, but for the court where 
his acts and conduct are admitted. 
In the case at· bar the evidence and testimo~ as 
given by the prosecutrix of the place and the alleged 
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acts of the commission of the crime, and denied by the 
defendant, puts such testimony before the jury in a 
conflicting state, and under such circumstances it was 
the duty of the court to put to the jury the question 
as to whether or not the complaining witness was an 
accomplice. 
In the case of Dickens vs. People (186 Pac. 277; 
67 Colorado 409) the court held: 
That the error of the court in refusing to give 
proper instructions will be presumed to be pre-
judicial in the absence of affirmative showing to 
the contrary. 
In the case of State vs. Carey ( 122 P·ac. 868) . the 
court states: 
That if the ju~ from a consideration of the char-
acter of the complaining witness was of the opin-
ion that he might readily be a party to such 
crime, they might, under certain circumstru1ces, 
be justified in reaching the conclusion that he 
was the guilty party alone, or an accomplice. 
If the ju~ was satisfied from the evidence that 
the complaining witness was an accomplice, if 
the offense was attempted, then and unless there 
was corroborating evidence, it would be the duty 
of the ju~ to acquit, for by the statute con-
viction cannot be had upon the uncorroborated 
evidence of an accomplice. 
Whebher he consented is a question for the ju~ 
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in all cases where the evidence is at all doubtful. 
The jur,y should have considered the question of 
whether or not the prosecutrix was an accomplice, as 
gathered from her character, her conduct and demeanor, 
both before and after the alleged commission of the 
crime, as testified to by the complaining witness 
(Tr-9, lines 15 to:"26), that she met the defendant at 
a beer tavern in Park City; that complaining witness 
and the defendant, after some conversation at The 
Drift, a beer tavern in Park City,_ Utah, left for 
Heber City, Utah (Tr-13); that before leaving, she, 
the complaining witness bought and paid for a bottle 
of wine for them to drink on the way to Heber City; 
(Tr-12, lines 6, 7, and 8); that the complaining 
witness had been charged with adultery and admit-
ted the charge (Tr-35, lines 13 to 25); that the 
complaining witness did not cry for help during or 
immediately after the commission of the alleged of-
fense while people in a car were present in the 
near vicinity; all of -r,.rhich testimony should have 
bP.An ~nnside~ed nnder n-rnnAr instructions from the 
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court as to whether or not the demeanor on the part 
of the complaining witness was not only salient to a 
consideration of her creditability, but should have 
been considered in connection with whether or not she 
was an accomplice in the act. 
547) 
The failure of the trial court at the request of 
the defendant to instruct the jury on the law of 
accomplices was held to be reversible error by 
the appellate court in Hewett vs. State, 1927, an 
Oklahoma case (38 Okla. Cr.m. 105; 259 Pac. 144), 
where the defendant was convicted of forgery in 
making a false entr.y in the records of the bank 
on the testimony of a fellow employee, who could 
have been found to have actually made the entry, 
under the direction of the defendant, and who 
acknowledged that it was false. 
In Wingo vs. State, a Texas case, 1919 (210 sW 
The appellate court reversed the conviction on 
the ground that the charge of the trial court 
unduly restricted the jur.y's right to find that 
the witness was an accomplice. The trial court 1 s 
charge predicated the jury's right to find that 
she was an accomplice upon their belief that she 
did voluntarily and with the same intent which 
actuated the defendant, unite with him in the 
alleged commission of the offense. The appellate 
court held that in determining whether or not she 
wa.s an accomplice where she had stated that she 
submitted through force and fear, the jury should 
consider all of the facts in the case in determin-
ing whether or not her testimony was an accom-
plice's testimony, and that if proof showed that 
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she consented, or did not_oppose the act, she 
was an accomplice witness. 
Under Paragraph 20 in 920 ALR, page 86, under the 
necessity for instruction to the jury, it has 
been held that where there is conflicting evi-
dence as to whether the witness is an accomplice, 
the trial court must instruct the jur,y upon the 
subject of accomplices regardless of whether or 
not such instruction has been requested by the 
defendant. 
Underhill on Criminal Evidence, under the topic 
of Crimes against Person, Paragraph 360, page 623, 
Second Edition, states: 
And as the crime is usually committed when no 
third party is present, corroboration is very 
difficult if not impossible to obtain, except 
so far as it may be found in circumstances which 
woulcrk!naturally accompany the commission of such 
offense. vfuen, however, the crime is attempted 
without or against the consent of the pathic par-
ty he is not an accomplice, and a conviction may 
be had upon his testimony alone. Whether he con-
sented is a question for the jury in all cases 
where the evidence is at all doubtful. Evidence 
to show that he did or did not consent is always 
relevant, particularly in the case of a charge of 
assault with intent to commit sodomy. 
In Cole vs. State (17.5 Pac. 2nd, 376), a.n Okla-
homa case, 1946, the court said: 
Although the presecuting witness denied that he 
consented to the act, there were strong circum-
stances to refute this statement, which would in-
dicate that he consented to what was done. His 
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testimony after the first act was committed was 
that he immediately ·went off to saeep in the same 
bed with the defendant, and did not awaken until 
the defendant disturbed him about sunrise while 
attempting to commit a second act. That the wit-
ness did not yell for help, or attempt to leave 
the premises, buttook a bath and listened to the 
radio while the defendant was shaving, prepara-
tory to going to church, that he went to church 
with the defendant and remained in his company 
during the day are strong ciraumstances to indi-
cate that if the act was committed it was with 
the consent of Roy Longhopper. If it was done 
with his consent then he was an accomplice, and 
his testiomny would have to be corroborated by 
independent evidence tending to connect the de-
fendant with the commission of the crime before 
the jury would have been jusitified in finding 
the defendant guilty. 
In this case the complaining witness didn't tell 
what happened for two months. In the case a bar the 
prosecutrix let two days elapse before she complained 
to the Sheriff of the alleged acts of the defendant. 
Moreoever, in the case at bar she did not c~ for help 
and remained in the defendant's company and purchased 
beer for him, and visited a beer tavern with him, and 
also her husband at the hospital as above recited. 
POINT NO. Ill 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING 1'0 INSTRUCT THE JURY 
ON ITS OWN VOLITION WHETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUTING 
WITNESS CHOULD HAVE BEEN .AN ACCCMPLICE UNDER THE FACrrs 
AI~D CIRCUMSTAl~CES OF THE CASE. 
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In Medis vs. State (27 Texas Appeals, 194; 11 
SW 112), the court held: 
That on trial for sodomy the testimony of a per-
son on which the act was committed must be cor-
roborated if he consented and the ju~ should be 
so instructed where the consent is in doubt. (See 
also Cole vs. State.) 
Although the defendant asked for an instruction 
to the effect that if the complaining witness consen-
ted to the alleged act of sodomy,· she would then be an 
accomplice, which/instruction the court refused, but the 
instruction requested was sufficient to call the court's 
attention to the subject of accomplices and that there 
might be facts and circumstances in the case tending 
to show the prosecuting witness to be an accomplice, 
and that the court on its own motion should have 
submitted this question to-~the jury, and if the court 
was dissatisfied ~;,Jith the instruction requested by 
the defendant, it should have defined for the jury 
the essential acts, nature and character of an accom-
plice. 
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In People vs. Warren (104 Pac. 2nd, 1024): 
The defendants were convicted of illegal posses-
sion of firearms. The only testimony implicating 
the named defendant was that of one Groom, who 
had been arrested on the same charge with others, 
and subsequently released. Groom denied on the 
stand that he owned or handled any guns, but he 
admitted that he had previously taken the cylin-
der out of one of them to a hardware store, and 
purchased bullets to fit it, and returned it to 
one of the defendants. The defendant, Warren, 
claimed that the trial court committed prejudi-
cial error in failing to instruct the jury as to 
what constituted an accomplice, and the necessity 
for the corroboration of the testimony of the ac-
complice, even though he had requested no such 
instructions at the trial. This contention was 
upheld by the appellate court in reversing the 
conviction as to warrant, on its findings, that 
there was testimony from which the jury might 
have concluded that Groom was an accomplice. 
People vs. Peturcci, 1947. 67 NY 2nd, 611; 271 
App. Div. 1936. 
Because of a ruling of the trial court, that as 
a matter of law, the complaining witness was not 
an accomplice of the defendant, the appellate 
court held that whether there was a voluntary sub-
mission to the act on his part was a question 
for the jury. 
In F'eople vs. Peck ( 18.5 Pac. 881) the court 
stated: 
It is the duty of'the court in criminal cases to 
give of its own motion, where they are not pro-
posed or presented in writing by the parties them-
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selves, instructions on the general principles of 
law pertinent to the case; but it is not his duty 
to give instructions on specific points developed 
through the evidence introduced in the trial, such 
as the legal scope of impeaching testimony, unless 
such instructions are requested by the party de-
siring them. 
The above case was also upheld by the California Appel-
late Court. 
In Hendrickson vs. Commonwealth (235 Kentuc~ 5, 
29 SW 2nd 646) the court said: 
Because of the failure of the trial court to 
instruct the jur,y as to the weight to be given the 
testimony of the co.-defendants in each case, that 
the jury could not properly pass on the questions 
of whether the witness was an accomplice or not 
without proper instructions from the court, and 
that it .was _the duty of the court to instruct the 
jur.y, and that where the facts authorized it; the 
failure to do so universally has been held by us 
to be such an error as to require reversal of the 
judgment. 
In the case at bar no instructions were given the 
jury on the subject of accomplices, and therefore the 
court and the jury could have assumed the complaining 
witness not to be an accomplice, although there were 
many facts and circumstances testified to upon which, 
under proper instructions, the ju~ could have consid-
ered the question of whether or not the prosecuting 
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witness was in fact an accomplice. Under the instruc-
tions given by the court to the jury it is assumed that 
the complaining witness was as a matter of law not an 
accomplice, and the jur,y1 s right to consider the ques-
tion of whether or not the facts justified a finding that 
she was an accomplice was denied consideration and 
deliberation. It is important and pertinent that the 
failure of the prosecuting witness to relate the 
alleged acts of the defendant to the officers for a 
period of two days after they were alleged to have 
happened casts some doubt upon the veracity of the 
testimony of the complaining witness, sufficient at 
least to have the question of whether or not she was 
an accomplice submitted to the jur,y as a question of 
fact, especially so where such acts and testimony as 
to the place and commission of the crime have been 
denied by the defendant himself. 
In People vs. Coffey (161 Cal. 443; 19 Pac. 901) 
the .court held: 
Whether a witness is an accomplice of the accused 
is for the determination of the jur,y on conflict-
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ing evidence, but for the court where his acts 
and conduct are admitted. 
POll\1T NO. IV 
THE COURT ERRED JN ALLO\~ING IN EVIDENCE HEARSAY 
STATEMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS ARISING FRa~ CONVERSATIONS 
NOT IN THE PRESENCE OF THE DEFENDANT .• 
The particular hearsay evidence which the court 
allowed was testified to by the Sheriff in a conversa-
tion with the defendant, Frank David Clauson, and 
over the objection of the defendant, the court allowed 
the following testimony to be given (Tr-82, line 15): 
A. I think I asked him, or Mr. Gale asked him, 
whehter or not he was not on shift that night. 
He said, "Yes o " He said he worked at the mine 
and he had brought her over before and worked 
too. I said, 11Are you sure you worked at the 
mine? 11 He said, "Yes, I worked at the mine." 
I said, 11Did you bring her directly to Heber?" 
And he said, 11Yes, I did. u I said, •ryou didn't 
stop anyplace 1 u He said, "No, I didn 1 t. " I 
said, ur believe I better tell you what she said." 
He said, trWha.t did she say? 11 I said, "She claims 
on the way over from Fark City, that you drove up 
the Kamas road and took her up someplace and"--
Mr. Hatch: I object to this testimony as being 
hearsay. I appreciate it is said for the purpose 
of clearing up what he said to Mr. Clauson, but 
ti is now giving what Mrs. North may have said to 
him, and, because of that, I object to that testi-
mony. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Court: He may state what ¥rr. Clauson said 
and also the conversation as to what he said, 
relative to this. 
Mr. Hatch: But not for the purpose of getting the 
hearsay between his conversations, between he and 
Mrs. North. 
Mr. Howard: He is relating what he said, not out-
side the presence of the Defendant. 
The Court: The objection is overruled. He may 
answer. 
A (Continued) "and took her up someplace on the 
mountain where he had illicit sexual relations." 
He said, ttthat is not 1rue. I drove her straight 
to Heber." I said, "She makes it even worse than 
that. She said you used a wire around her throat 
and also that you stuck her with a knife in an at-
tempt to make her give in to you. 11 He Said, "That 
is not the truth", that he didn 1 t take her off the 
road against her will or at a.ny time. I said, 
"You certainly don't have to tell me anything that 
you don't want to, I am just telling you what 
Mrs. North said. n So we continued on' to Heber 
City and that is about all the conversation that 
I recall until we got to the courthouse. Then, 
as we came in the office, Mr. Gale and I sat down. 
At that time, Mr. Clauson remembered that perhaps 
he had laid off a day that week. He said he 
didn't make it back on shift, that he had lais off 
a day and he thought it was the 13th. 
The conversation between the complaining witness, 
Mavis North, and the Sheriff was made outside the pre-
sence of the defendant, and therefore. constitutes 
hearsay, and the defendant contends that the court, in 
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overruling the objection to its admission, prejudiced 
the rights of the defendant to a fair and impartial 
trial. 
In the case of People vs. Huston, (1?4 Pac. 2nd 
758; 21 Cal. 2nd 690) the court said: 
The fact that the prosecutrix made a complaint in 
the prosecution for committing a lewd act is ad-
missible as "original evidence,n but testimony 
concerning the details as then given, or the name 
6£tthe defendant accused is hearsay. 
In Coppage vs~ State (1?7 Pac. 2nd 797), ap Okla-
homa case, the court on appeal said: 
In rape prosecution testimony of prosecutrix 1s 
employer as to conversation with prosecutrix 
after she had been brought back to City by all-
eged assailant, during which interval prosecutrix 
had opportunity to deliberate upon a statement was 
not part of 11 res gestae" and hence was inadmiss-
ible as hearsay. 
Generally testimony cannot be corroborated by 
proof that the witness stated same facts testi-
fied to in court on some occasion when not under 
oath and not in the presence of the accused, but 
such statements are excluded as hearsay. 
In People vs. Bro~~ (16' Pac. 2nd 699) a Califor-
nia case, the court said: 
In eex cases generally, evidence of recital of 
facts by victim to third party is inadmissible 
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McPhee vs. People; Supreme Court of Colorado, 
January 29, 1940 (98 Pac. 2nd 997). On page 998 of 
the report the court said: 
Chief Boyer (police chief) and Sohoepflin (a co-
conspirator) were permitted to testify to a con-
versation occu·rring between them, when the defend-
ant was not present, as to the manner in which 
McPhee (defendant) wanted to dispose of stolen 
cars. This evidence was clearly hearsay •••• 
The statements made by Sehoepflin to Boyer with 
reference to McPhee's participation in the con-
spiracy to dispose of stolen automobiles, while 
admissible against Schoepflin under the circum-
stances, if he had been on trial, were not ad-
missible against McPhee. 
The court fUrther said in the past paragraph on page 
998 of the report: 
Under these circumstances the admission of the 
hearsay testimony, particularly that of Boyer 
(police chief) constituted prejudicial error. 
(The designation of parties in parentheses are ours.) 
People vs. Jaramillo (30 Pac. 2nd 427; Cal. Appo 
2?2), 19?4, said: 
207)! 
Police woman 1 s statement that an interpreter said 
to· her that defendant, who spoke Spanish, admit-
ted sexual relations with prosecutrix held inad-
missible as hearsay. 
People vs. Mangum (32 Cal. App. 2nd; 88 Pac. 2nd, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In prosecution for rape by force, objections to 
questions propounded to witness and calling for a 
conversation between witness and prosecutrix were 
properly sustained, since questions call for hear-
say testimony. 
In Clark vs. People (86 Pac. 2nd 257) (10) Colo-
rado )71), the Colorado Supreme Court held: 
case: 
In prosecution for murder by abortion, permitting 
man by whom the deceased was pregnant to testify 
that the deceased had told him she was going to 
have an abortion performed by the defendant was 
reversible error, where conversation took place 
out of the defendant's presence and prior to the 
time the· deceased met the defendant. 
State vs. Chealey (116 Pac. 2nd, ?77), a Utah 
In involuntary manslaughter prosecution based on 
death resulting when truck driven by accused over-
turned, testimony as to conversations between two 
persons at the time when the accused was not pre-
sent should have been excluded as hearsay, but if 
admissible, such testimony was admissible only for 
impeachment purposes. 
In State vs. Cheameres (147 Pac. 2nd, 815; modified 
in 150 Pac. 2nd, 1012), a Washington case, the court 
said: 
In prosecution for living with a common prostitute, 
testimony of investigator for office of prosecut-
ing attorney, that woman with whom the defendant 
was charged with living told him that she was a· 
- -~--- --- _ .... ..: ...... ..~:-_-, :--?:.~ =~:.:3.dmissi ble as hearsay, in 
~_- ~ -_::_-:..:;..:_:- -:,hat the defendant was 
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present when the admission was made. 
In the case of Miller vs. People, Supreme Court 
of Colorado, February 24, 1936 (55 Pac. 2nd )20), under 
Notes 3 - 5 on Page 321 of the report the court says: 
The law seems to be that, while statements, con-
fessions, and admissions of guilt made by one of 
several persons jointly indicted and tried for the 
same offense are admissible against the person 
making them, they are not admissible against his 
co-defendants unless made in their presence and 
assented to by them. 
In the same case the court further states: 
Sheriff1 s testimony as to private conversations 
with the principal in the commission of a crime 
implicating a co-defendant as accessory before 
the fact, held inadmissible as hearsay in a sep-
arate trial of such co-defendant. 
In the case at bar, alt~ough Sheriff Payne testified 
to a conversation he had with the defendant, the ob-
jectionable part of that conversation being that he 
was allowed to repeat on the witness stand, and before 
the jury, statements and conclusions which the com-
plaining witness had told him, while not under oath 
and out of the presence of the defendant, and after 
the occurrence of an interval of two days from the 
al, - - _, - ---.!. - _.: -:·~. 1":)-r t".b~ crime upon the person of 
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• the complaining witness, and after she had purchased 
a bottle of whiskey. Clearly such testimony is hear-
say under the authorities, and a reptition of such 
statements made by the· complaining witness to the Sher-
iff, and repeated by him on the witness stand tended 
to lend dignity and enhancement to them and could 
have easily influenced the jury as to their truth when 
spoken by such a creditable witness. 
Viewing the record as a whole, the defendant con-
tends that he has not had a fair and impartial trial, 
and that the errors of the trial court, as pointed 
out in this brief, are of such serious moment as to ar-
rest the attention of the court, and warrant reversing 
the judgment of the court below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Glen s. Hatch 
A. M. Marsden 
Attorneys for 
Appellant 
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